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Book review 
Philip G. Joyce, 2011. The Congressional Budget Office: Honest 
Numbers, Power and Policymaking. Washington, D.C.: 
Georgetown University Press. 
Richard Allen 
The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) was established in 1974, one of a fundamen-
tally important series of measures included in the Congressional Budget and Impound-
ment Control Act to strengthen the role of Congress in the budget process. The Act 
brought to an end a period of presidential dominance in the budget process, and has ar-
guably turned it too far in the opposite direction. Philip Joyce’s new book provides an 
excellent history of the CBO. Equally important, it relates the CBO’s role to the rough 
and tumble of Congressional decision making, thus making the book a valuable case 
study of the political economy of the American budget process.  
The book – which is well-researched and comprehensive, and can be strongly recom-
mended to students of budgeting and public policy - is organized into several chapters. 
These begin by describing the origins and history of the CBO, and its organization into 
various functions and divisions that are responsible for macrobudgeting, microbudget-
ing and policy analysis. In addition, the book includes two excellent case studies of the 
distinguished (if controversial) role played by the CBO in relation to the Clinton Health 
Care Plan of 1993/94 and the Obama Plan sixteen years later. The agency also had an 
important influence on the Carter energy policy, which demonstrated CBO’s capacity to 
undertake policy analysis, and in the assessment of financial risks associated with gov-
ernment guarantees to the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Corporations (Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac) and the saving and loans crisis of the mid-1980s. The book concludes by 
drawing lessons from the work carried out by the CBO during its 35-year history.  
A critically important (and surprising) decision taken by the Congress – that most parti-
san of organizations - was to establish the CBO as nonpartisan. As Joyce observes: 
“There is a necessary connection between CBO objectivity, credibility, and influence 
…. If players in the policymaking process did not believe that CBO was an unbiased 
referee when making the tough calls, the agency would lose credibility, and become 
viewed as yet another partisan voice. No agency of roughly two hundred people could 
remain influential in such a context.” (page 7) Another key decision, which was partly a 
matter of luck, was the choice of Alice Rivlin (1975-83) as the first director of the CBO. 
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The organization has been fortunate with the choice of subsequent directors, especially 
Rudy Penner (1983-87) and Robert Reischauer (1989-95), who were skilled and experi-
enced technicians, as well as adroit managers of the political process. Difficulties, well 
documented by Joyce, arose in some other cases. Holtz-Eakins (2003-05), for example, 
came from the Bush White House and created initial concerns among Democrats, but 
defied expectations with his straight-shooting. Crippen (1999-2003) had a rocky begin-
ning in his relationship with CBO staff, but weathered the storm and supported CBO 
analyses that were critical of the government-sponsored agencies (GSEs) such as Fannie 
Mae, despite having been a GSE lobbyist. The CBO has also been fortunate in finding 
allies among key members of Congress, especially during periods when its future was 
uncertain. And it has skillfully used Presidential support to its advantage. For example, 
President Obama’s insistence that his Healthcare reform plan must reduce the deficit 
enormously strengthened the CBO’s hand because “the only way to convince some 
members of the Congress that the bill actually reduced the deficit was for CBO to certi-
fy that it had” (page 231). 
The mandate and resources of the organization has increased greatly compared with the 
initial concept of the CBO as an office to make technical estimates of the cost of budget 
initiatives. It now has a staff of around 240, many of whom have top academic creden-
tials. Under its early directors, it developed a public face, and proved skillful in using 
the media, sometimes facing the ire of Members of Congress as a result. Macroeconom-
ic projections and cost estimates produced by the CBO match the quality of - and are 
seemingly less biased than - those produced by the executive branch, including the Of-
fice of Management and Budget (OMB). Over time, the CBO hugely expanded its ca-
pacity for policy analysis, especially in the health sector, and it became the fountain of 
wisdom on often arcane issues relating to budget procedures and concepts. In this latter 
area, the CBO’s opinion, on an essentially technical issue, namely that federally man-
dated payments for health insurance should be scored as part of the budget, contributed 
to the demise of the Clinton Health Care Plan in 1994. 
Despite the beneficial influence of the CBO, Joyce reiterates the widely-held view that 
the federal budget process is a mess. The government does not enact its budget on time: 
all appropriation bills have been passed prior to the beginning of the fiscal year in only 
four of the past 35 years. The federal deficit, which had been eradicated in the late 
1990s, has soared to historic post world-War II levels. Long-term fiscal problems asso-
ciated with providing entitlement benefits to an aging population have been largely ig-
nored by both political leaders and their constituents. The budget process remains dom-
inated by spending and tax earmarks. Instead of following international trends toward 
greater transparency, the budget has become less transparent, for example by using sup-
plemental appropriations to fund disaster relief and opaque reporting of support to fi-
nancial institutions affected by the global financial crisis.  
The CBO is not responsible for these failures, of course, but they underline the limita-
tions of its influence in an increasingly partisan environment of congressionally–
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dominated budgeting. Joyce concludes that the type of information and analysis CBO 
provides is necessary to effective policymaking. Sadly, it is only necessary, not suffi-
cient. Many of CBO’s experiences – from its work on government-sponsored enterpris-
es, to its analysis of the nation’s long-term fiscal liabilities – suggest that only external 
political imperatives result in progress toward solutions. Nevertheless, and somewhat 
paradoxically, information provided by the CBO on the cost of policies has had a posi-
tive influence on the design of these policies. Its importance rests, not only on the pro-
duction of written reports but on “the existence of a nonpartisan organization that can 
forge relationships, advise committees and staff, respond to letters, testify before Con-
gress, and generally become part of the ‘nervous system’ of Congress.” (page 232) The 
future success of the CBO is likely to depend on the desire of CBO leadership to pro-
duce quality nonpartisan information in a timely manner, and the desire of Congress to 
make use of these data to make decisions that are in the long-term interest of the coun-
try, rather than their own short-term interests. 
Many countries have implemented independent fiscal councils in some form, but (with 
the possible exception of Korea and Mexico) these are not based on the CBO model. 
Other countries have very different arrangements for budget-making; and the mandate 
of their fiscal council is often narrower than the CBO’s, and has significantly less re-
sources. In fact, most fiscal councils are quite modest affairs, based more on the Sweden 
model. This being the case it is interesting to ask whether countries should be more am-
bitious and consider setting up fiscal councils with a broader mandate and more re-
sources. A skeptic might respond in the negative, since the US has a rotten (in many 
senses) budget system and bad fiscal outcomes, despite the CBO. It may well be that the 
CBO has too broad a mandate and spreads its enormous resources too thinly. Neverthe-
less, other countries may be able to learn from the experience of the U.S., and the U.S. 
to learn from other countries. 
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